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Three Strikes, Two Bites at the Apple, and One Offense?: An
Examination of Monge v. California and the Double Jeopardy
Clause's Inapplicability to Three Strikes Law
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, the evolution of
the Double Jeopardy Clause from its common-law origins was driven
by the desire to eradicate the threat of multiple prosecutions.' At its
most basic level, double jeopardy precludes review of an acquittal,
regardless of the reason behind that acquittal.2 Two obvious, but
essential issues in determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes the review of a case are what constitutes an acquittal3 and
what constitutes an offense.4
The line between a criminal offense and a factor to be considered
in sentencing has been blurred due to recent federal and state
sentencing statutes promulgated to assuage public' disillusionment
with a criminal justice system perceived as too lenient on criminals.5
The Supreme Court historically has categorized sentencing
determinations separately from resolutions of the factual elements of
a case, holding that sentencing proceedings are unprotected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.6 The increased complexity of sentencing
statutes, however, has introduced the issue of whether both
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "); see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332,336-43 (1975) (tracing the course of statutory authority allowing Government appeals
in light of the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)
("[S]ociety's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for
the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal
laws."); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (determining that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precluded a second trial for first-degree murder after the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder).
2. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (holding that, even when
an acquittal was based on an "erroneous foundation," the acquittal was final and
unreviewable); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) ("[A] verdict of acquittal...
could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in
jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.").
3. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 270 (1970) (emphasizing that what
constitutes an acquittal is not controlled by the form of a judge's action).
4. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 (1998) (discussing
the difference between a separate criminal offense and a sentencing factor).
5. See infra notes 253-70 and accompanying text (describing statutory sentencing
movements).
6. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132-38 (1980); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,723 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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sentencing and resentencing proceedings can violate constitutional
protections against double jeopardy.7 In Monge v. California,8 the
Court held that a Three Strikes law9 does not trigger double jeopardy
protections, regardless of how blurred the distinction between an
element of the offense and a fact for sentencing purposes. 0
This Note discusses the facts of Monge, its lower court history,
and the reasoning behind the Court's decision." The Note reviews
the history of California's Three Strikes law, 2 placing the law in the
context of other statutory sentencing enhancements at both the state
and federal level. 3 Next, the Note examines case law addressing the
Double Jeopardy Clause, focusing on the Court's reluctance to apply
the Clause to most sentencing procedures. 4 The Note also analyzes
the Court's failure to apply other constitutional protections to
sentencing statutes. 5 The Note then considers the reasoning behind
the Court's refusal to extend double jeopardy protections to non-
capital sentencing proceedings. 6 Finally, the Note examines the
constitutional implications of allowing the states to legislate complex
sentencing guidelines that elude constitutional protections. 7
On January 25, 1995, undercover officers from the Pomona
Police Department were riding in an unmarked car on West Ninth
Street in Pomona, California.'8 A thirteen-year-old boy standing by
the curb gestured for the car to pull over; instead, the officers pulled
into an alley in front of an apartment complex where they had
observed narcotics activity.'9 Defendant Angel Monge approached
the car, at which time the officers rolled down their window and
7. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Cal. 1997), affd sub. nom. Monge v.
California, 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998); see also Paul M. Winters et al., Sentencing Guidelines, 83
GEo. L.J. 1229, 1262 (1995) ("Resentencing is required when the sentencing judge fails to
make explicit findings or to disclaim reliance on controverted matters."); id. at 1265-67
nn.2233-34 (listing cases in which resentencing was required).
8. 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1994). Three Strikes law is a common label
for recidivist legislation that enhances a defendant's sentence based on her status as a
repeat offender. See 16B AM. JUR. CONSTrr. L. § 656 (1998).
10. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2252-53.
11. See infra notes 18-103 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-89 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 213-63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 264-89 and accompanying text.
18. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Cal. 1997), affid sub. nom. Monge v.
California, 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
19. See id.
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asked Monge where they could buy marijuana. ° Monge failed to
answer and walked over to a carport.21 The officers started to pull out
of the alley when they saw the thirteen-year-old boy behind their
car. Monge handed the boy some plastic bags, and the boy walked
towards the officer's car and asked the officers how much they
wanted to buy.3 The officers paid twenty dollars for two "dime bags"
and left the alley.24  The undercover officers informed other
uniformed officers who then arrested both Monge and the boy.25 At
the time of his arrest, Monge had the same twenty dollars from the
undercover officers in his possession.26
The District Attorney charged Monge with using a minor to sell
marijuana, possession of marijuana for sale, and sale or
transportation of marijuana. Based on Monge's prior conviction for
felony assault with a deadly weapon, the District Attorney claimed
that Monge should be subject to two sentence enhancement
provisions under California's Three Strikes law.' First, the District
Attorney argued that the prior conviction was a "serious felony. '29
Under the California statute, a defendant with two prior "serious"
felony convictions may receive a maximum sentence of twenty-five








27. See id. Monge was charged with violating California Health and Safety Code
§ 11361(a), which prohibits the use of a minor to sell marijuana; § 11359, which prohibits
possession of marijuana for sale; and § 11360(a), which prohibits transportation or sale of
marijuana. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11359,11360(a), 11361(a) (West 1991).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West Supp. 1999); Monge, 941 P.2d at 1123-24.
29. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1123-24; see also infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text
(discussing whether Monge had been convicted of a prior felony for purposes of the Three
Strikes law). Under California's Three Strikes law, the defendant's prior conviction
resulted in a five-year enhancement that doubled part of his sentence from five years to
ten years for using a minor to sell marijuana. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(1),
1170.12(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2), 1170.12(c)(2)(A). When a defendant has
two or more felony convictions, the statute provides that the term for the instant felony
conviction is "an indeterminate term of life imprisonment ... or twenty-five years." Id
§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). A "serious felony" in California has been defined as similar to
a "violent felony," including:
murder or voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, rape, sodomy by force, oral
copulation by force, child molestation, any felony that carries a life sentence, any
felony where the accused causes great bodily injury on anyone other than an
accomplice or if the defendant uses a firearm, robbery in a dwelling house or
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with one prior serious felony conviction receives a doubled
sentence." Second, because Monge had served prison time for the
previous conviction, he was subject to a one-year enhancement for
prior prison time served.32 Monge pleaded not guilty and contested
the applicability of the Three Strikes law to his sentence.33
California Penal Code Section 1192.7 recognizes assault as a
serious felony if the defendant "personally inflicts great bodily injury
on any person,134 or if the defendant "personally used a dangerous or
deadly weapon"35 in the assault. The California legislature has
protected against the incorrect labeling of prior convictions as serious
felonies by implementing procedural protections for prior conviction
assessments.3 6 Not only does the defendant have the right to a jury
trial, in which the prosecution is burdened with a reasonable doubt
standard of proof,3 7 but the defendant also retains the right against
self-incrimination. 38 Furthermore, the rules of evidence apply and the
defendant has the right to cross-examine witnesses. 9
vessel in which the defendant used a firearm, arson, attempted murder,
kidnapping, and carijacking.
Id.; Meredith McClain, Note, "Three Strikes and You're Out". The Solution to the Repeat
Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 107 n.40 (1996). The category of
serious felony also includes:
assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument on a peace officer; assault by a life prisoner on a non inmate; assault
with a deadly weapon by an inmate; ... attempt to commit a felony punishable
by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; any felony in which the
defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; selling, furnishing,
administering, giving or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor
any heroin, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), or any methamphetamine-related drug
*- grand theft involving a firearm.
Id. at 107 n.41 (emphasis added).
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) ("If a defendant has one prior serious felony
conviction that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an
indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the
current felony conviction.").
32 See id. § 667.5(b).
33. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1124.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(8) (West Supp. 1999).
35. Id. § 1192.7(c)(23).
36. See id. § 1025(a), (b) (West Supp. 1999). The California Supreme Court has
interpreted § 1025 broadly and has included enhanced procedural guarantees in a
defendant's right to a jury trial on the prior conviction assessment issue. See People v.
Reed, 914 P.2d 184, 188 (Cal. 1996) (holding that the rules of evidence apply in these trials
and that a defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him).
37. See, e.g., Reed, 914 P.2d at 188.
38. See, e.g., In re Yurko, 519 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1974) (holding that the defendant
has a privilege against self-incrimination).
39. See, e.g., People v. Woodell, 950 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Cal. 1998) (looking to California's
Evidence Code for a determination of whether a defendant's "record of conviction" is
[Vol. 772010
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Upon his arrest, Monge waived his right to a jury trial on the
issues of his prior conviction and prior prison term.40  The court
granted his request and bifurcated the proceedings-one trial to
determine guilt and another to determine sentencing, based on the
defendant's status as a recidivist.41 One week after a jury convicted
Monge on the substantive issues surrounding the drug charges,
sentencing proceedings against him reconvened.4 2 Monge again
agreed to admit that his prior conviction was a serious felony, but
after an off-the-record discussion, he articulated his wish to deny his
admission of his prior conviction.4  He did not, however, change his
waiver of a jury trial and requested that the judge try the issue of his
prior conviction without a jury.'
Due to section 1192.7's requirement that a defendant convicted
of assault with a deadly weapon have personally inflicted great bodily
injury or have personally used the dangerous or deadly weapon, an
issue arose as to whether Monge personally used a deadly weapon in
his prior conviction.45 While the prosecution claimed that Monge had
personally used a stick during the assault, the defense argued that the
stick could not be classified as a deadly weapon.46 After stating that
admissible).





45. See id. The prior conviction at issue involved the use of a stick in an assault. See
infra notes 46, 49 (discussing whether Monge personally used the stick in an assault).
46. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1124. The defendant's argument that his prior conviction
could not be classified as assault with a deadly weapon under § 1192.7 is confusing.
During oral argument, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to clarify how the stick's status
as a deadly weapon could be a contested issue in light of the defendant's earlier guilty plea
and asked the petitioner to clarify the issue:
"Question: ... I never understood why, given that circumstance [defendant's
prior conviction being labeled 'assault with a deadly weapon'], the California
intermediate court could have held there wasn't enough evidence. Mr. Gardner:
.... [A]n assault finding ... even if it's assault with a deadly weapon doesn't
mean personal use, because there's always the factor of aiding and abetting."
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 25-29, Monge (No. 97-6146), available
in 1998 WL 222955 at *27. Thus, Monge argued that because "in and of itself, California
law ... does not provide sufficient evidence" that a conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon implicates a defendant for personal use of that weapon, the court had insufficient
evidence to convict him under section 1192.7. Id. The ultimate argument as to Monge's
prior conviction revolved around the uncertainty as to his personal use of the stick. See id.
Defense counsel's initial argument that the stick could not be labeled a deadly weapon was
less compelling (and eventually discarded) because Monge's pleading guilty to the assault
charge contradicted his argument. See id. at 26 ("The only question was whether he
personally used a weapon."); see also infra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the
1999] 2011
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Monge had already pleaded guilty to the charge of assault with a
deadly weapon, thereby acknowledging that the stick could be
classified as a deadly weapon,47 the court asked if either party wished
to submit more evidence on the matter.48 The prosecution introduced
into evidence a "prison packet" and an abstract of judgment, both of
which characterized the previous conviction as an assault with a
deadly weapon, but neither of which implicated Monge as personally
having used the weapon.49 The court concluded that Monge had been
convicted of and served time for a prior serious felony involving his
personal use of a deadly weapon. 0 Consequently, the Three Strikes
law doubled Monge's sentence to ten years and added a one year
enhancement for the prior prison term.5
Monge appealed the sentence, claiming that the Three Strikes
law was unconstitutional because it violated his due process rights.5 2
The California Court of Appeal went further and questioned whether
application of a sentence enhancement violated double jeopardy
protections by demanding a review of insufficient evidence from his
prior conviction 3 The court of appeal affirmed the conviction on the
substantive charges but remanded the case for resentencing, holding
that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant
had a prior serious felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon
for purposes of section 1192.7 and that the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment barred retrial of the issue.54
language of California Penal Code section 245 under which Monge was convicted).
47. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 26, Monge (No. 97-6146).
48. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1997), aff'd sub. nom. Monge v.
California, 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
49. See id. The prison packet and abstract of judgment described Monge's prior
conviction as "PC 245(a)(1) ADW GBI" and "ASLT W/DW 245(a)(1)(PC)" and
evidenced his conviction for assault in violation of California Penal Code § 245. Id.
However, section 245 does not charge the defendant with personal use of a deadly
weapon; its language is more general and criminalizes the commission of "an assault upon
the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument ... likely to produce great
bodily injury." CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999). At oral argument,
defense counsel characterized the prison packet as providing insufficient evidence to
classify Monge's prior conviction under section 1192.7, stating: "The prosecutor slipped
here because what the prosecutor introduced was a four-page document that did, indeed,
show that the defendant was convicted of assault in 1992 .... [but not] that the defendant
personally used a weapon." United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 24-25,
Monge (No. 97-6146). The prison packet contained fingerprints, a picture, and
information regarding the nature of the conviction. See id. at 30.







The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether
a proceeding that determines the "truth of a prior serious felony
allegation" in a non-capital case is protected by state and federal
prohibitions against double jeopardy 5 Reversing the lower court's
holding, the court concluded that double jeopardy protections are
triggered by sentencing proceedings only in capital cases.56 The court
compared the sentencing proceedings at issue in Monge57 with those
in Bullington v. Missouri.8 In Bullington, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a court from changing the
defendant's sentence from life imprisonment to death in a bifurcated
sentencing proceeding when the jury's sentence had been one of life
imprisonment.59
In distinguishing Monge from Bullington, the California Supreme
Court relied exclusively on Monge's status as a non-capital case.60
The court first reasoned that capital proceedings financially and
emotionally burden the defendant more than non-capital cases,
thereby triggering additional constitutional protections.61 In addition,
the court noted that a state is not constitutionally required to provide
a trial on non-capital sentencing issues, and thus, California need not
provide a non-capital defendant with all of the procedural guarantees
that would attend a trial on guilt or innocence.6' Finally, the court
held that a qualifying "strike" in Monge's case required the finding of
a specific "status,"63 while a sentencing decision in a capital case
required consideration of facts arising from the crime for which the
defendant is being tried as well as a general character assessment.64
55. Id. at 1125.
56. See id at 1129.
57. See id.
58. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
59. See id. at 445.
60. See Monge, 941 P.2d at 1127-30.
61. See id. at 1129.
62. See iL at 1129-30. The Court's rationale was not clearly based on legal analysis-
it cited "common-sense" as suggesting that "when a state legislature has elected at its
option to provide a trial-like proceeding to resolve a factual issue ... the legislature need
not provide all the procedural protections that apply in a constitutionally mandated trial."
Id. at 1128.
63. Id. at 1129 (using "status" to refer to a fact about the defendant easily garnered
from the public record, such as age or gender).
64. See id The majority opinion reasoned that a defendant's status as a repeat
offender would not trigger the stigma of a criminal charge because it was merely a
determination of punishment. See id. The court regarded factual determinations
surrounding prior convictions as "divorced from the facts of the present offense" and held
that they should be viewed "irrespective of the present offense." Id. at 1130. However, a
capital sentence proceeding relies on "specific facts of the defendant's present crime" and
"an overall assessment of the defendant's character," which results in evidentiary overlap
1999] 2013
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California Supreme Court Justice Brown concurred, reasoning
that a retrial on the existence of prior conviction was not an
examination of evidence surrounding the substantive offense and
consequently would not put the defendant in double jeopardy.65
Three justices dissented on the grounds that Bullington applied to
non-capital sentencing cases, thus precluding repeat attempts at
proving that Monge had personally committed the assault in his prior
conviction in accordance with the classification of "serious felonies"
under section 1192.7.66
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because the state
court decision intensified a conflict over Bullington's applicability to
non-death penalty cases.67  In an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, the Court affirmed the state court decision that Bullington
does not extend to non-capital cases.'
In analyzing the case, the Court first provided a historical
overview of the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause, noting
that prior decisions have not applied double jeopardy protections to
sentencing proceedings because such proceedings "do not place a
defendant in jeopardy for an 'offense.' "69 In addition, sentence
enhancements have traditionally not been classified as repeat
punishments for prior offenses because instead of focusing on an
element of the prior offense, a sentence enhancement increases a
sentence based on the "manner" in which a defendant "committed
the crime of conviction."7  The Court further distinguished
between the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. Id.
65. See id. at 1134-35 (Brown, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 1135-57 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
67. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250. Prior to the Court's granting of certiorari, both
state supreme courts and federal appellate courts had reached different conclusions on the
issue of whether double jeopardy protections applied to non-capital sentencing
proceedings. Compare Carpenter v. Chapleau, 72 F.3d 1269, 1274 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the defendant was not put in double jeopardy when the State used the same
convictions in two trials for purposes of enhancing his sentence), and Briggs v. Procunier,
764 F.2d 368, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the State's retrial of the petitioner
based on the original primary offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause), with People
v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317, 325 (Ill. 1993) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not prohibit a second attempt at enhanced sentencing under the Habitual Criminal Act),
and State v. Hennings, 670 P.2d 256, 262 (Wash. 1983) (concluding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars a second habitual-criminal proceeding when the prosecution failed
to prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt); see also infra note 189 (discussing
the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to non-capital sentencing proceedings in
lower courts).
68. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2248.
69. Id at 2250 (emphasizing the use of the terminology in the Double Jeopardy
Clause barring successive prosecution for the same offense).
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997)); see also Witte v.
2014 [Vol. 77
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sentencing enhancements from acquittals, noting that the Court has
held that lack of evidence prohibits retrial of an overturned
conviction, but that lack of proof in a sentencing trial "does not 'have
the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.' "'7
The Court also reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
exist to protect a defendant against excessive sentencing and that the
Clause has never prevented prosecutors from requesting a lengthened
sentence after a defendant's successful appeal.72
The crux of the Court's reasoning was that Bullington, in which a
capital sentencing proceeding violated double jeopardy protections,
was a "narrow exception" to the general rule that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not protect a defendant during sentencing
proceedings.73 In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that
while the Court's reasoning in Bullington rested in part on the
sentence proceeding's similarity to a trial of guilt or innocence and
the consequent triggering of procedural protections, the Bullington
holding rested in greater part on the unique nature of a capital
proceeding.7 4
The Court recognized Bullington as a response to "the acute
need for reliability in capital sentencing proceedings."'75 The Court
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1995) (clarifying that the "use of evidence of related
criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime" within the
statutory guidelines does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause); Gryger v. Burke, 334
U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (holding that a persistent offender's enhanced sentence "is not to be
viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes" but a
"stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense
because a repetitive one."). The majority in Monge also addressed Justice Scalia's dissent,
in which he claimed the sentence enhancement at issue was part of the offense but argued
that under United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), the enhancement
was "constitutionally permissible." Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250-51; id. at 2256 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Monge
majority's discussion of Almendarez-Torres).
71. Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134
(1980)).
72. See id. (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969), overruled by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919)).
73. Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251 (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222,231 (1994)).
74. See id. at 2251-52.
75. Id. at 2252 ("Because the death penalty is unique in 'both its severity and finality,'
we have recognized an acute need for reliability in capital sentencing proceedings."
(quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977))); see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984) ("[We have consistently required that capital proceedings be
policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the
accuracy of factfinding."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (stating that the
qualitative difference between the death penalty and other penalties calls for a greater
degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed). Although the Bullington Court
pointed to both the bifurcated trial and the capital nature of the sentence as factors in its
1999] 2015
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rejected Monge's argument that by bifurcating Three Strikes
hearings, the California legislature had automatically guaranteed
defendants constitutional protection against double jeopardy.76 The
Court further reasoned that only capital sentencing proceedings force
the defendant to" 'live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty.' "I' The Court claimed its decision was consistent
with prior decisions that either applied constitutional protections to
capital sentencing proceedings or declined the opportunity to imbue a
non-capital defendant with constitutional protections. 8
Finally, the Court concluded that capital sentencing proceedings
trigger constitutional protection because of the inseparability of the
"nature and consequence" of the proceedings.79  That is, the basic
respect for humanity that gave birth to the Eighth Amendment
demands examination of a capital defendant's record and character as
a " 'constitutionally indispensable' " part of capital sentencing
procedure." In a capital case, the Constitution compels the court to
regard mitigating and aggravating circumstances as determined by
factors drawn from events in the defendant's life prior to the
commission of the crime." The Court refused to apply these
constitutional protections to non-capital sentencing proceedings,
however, holding that any examination of a non-capital defendant's
prior convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement is governed
by whatever particular protections state legislation grants the
defendant.82
Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia each dissented separately.8 3
Justice Stevens's dissent claimed that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a second trial any time the prosecution has failed to present
decision, the Monge majority primarily recognized the capital sentencing as the rationale
triggering constitutional protections. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
76. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2252.
77. lId (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
78. See id.; see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 397 (1994) (holding that the
nonretroactivity rule bars the extension of Bullington to non-capital sentencing
proceedings); Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 30 (1985) (per curiam) (holding
that sentencing in a non-capital case does not have the same constitutional finality that an
acquittal does); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87 (holding that "[a] capital sentencing
proceeding ... is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of
standards for decision" to trigger constitutional protection).
79. Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2253.
80. Ia- (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304 (1976)).
81. See id.
82- See id. (labeling trial-like protections in non-capital sentencing proceedings "a
matter of legislative grace, not constitutional command").
83. See id. at 2253-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2255-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2016 [Vol. 77
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sufficient evidence in the first proceeding. 4  Moreover, Justice
Stevens argued that double jeopardy applicability is based on whether
the need for a retrial was due to insufficient evidence or trial error
rather than the nature of the proceeding in question.' Justice
Stevens also argued that "traditional understanding" of fundamental
fairness dictated that California accord recidivist defendants
protection from double jeopardy. 6
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, conceded
that the Bullington exception should not be applied to non-capital
cases but argued that California's Three Strikes law indicates a trend
towards the false labeling of criminal trials as sentence enhancements,
thereby violating the Double Jeopardy Clause and other
constitutional protections. s7 Justice Scalia referred to the Court's
recent decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States"8 to highlight
the similarity between a fact used for sentence enhancement and a
fact used as an element of an offense.89 Urging examination of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of Anglo-American legal
principles, Justice Scalia pointed out that criminal "offenses" are
made up of "elements," which must be proved for conviction.9
84. See id. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
11 (1978)).
85. See id at 2254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2254-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that a state's
decision to provide some protections to recidivist defendants does not automatically
trigger constitutional duties "that would not otherwise exist." Id. at 2254 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, California's inception of other procedural safeguards for sentence
enhancements was alone insufficient to implicate double jeopardy protections. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that other states' tendencies to incorporate
constitutional obligations into sentence enhancement decisions should be interpreted as
"powerful evidence that [the states] were responding to the traditional understanding of
fundamental fairness." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Stevens argued that
fundamental fairness requires double jeopardy protections be attached to California's
Three Strikes law. See id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 2255-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998).
89. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres, 118 S.
Ct. at 1239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Almendarez-Torres, the defendant was convicted of
illegal reentry into the United States after deportation. See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct.
at 1222. The Court held that a statute adding 20 years to the sentence of any illegal
returnee was a mere "penalty" provision and the illegal reentry should be treated as a
sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense. See id. at 1230. In so holding, the
Court allowed the "enhancement" of a sentence 24 months to 85 months. See id. at 1223.
90. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The fundamental distinction
between facts that are elements of a criminal offense and facts that go only to the sentence
provides the foundation for our entire Double Jeopardy jurisprudence-including the
'same elements' test for determining whether two 'offence[s]' are 'the same.' " (emphasis
added) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932))).
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Justice Scalia noted that the difference between elements of the
offense and sentencing factors creates the "foundation for our entire
double jeopardy jurisprudence."'" Because the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against the readmission of facts that are elements of
the offense but not facts that are sentencing factors, the Clause
assumes elements of the offense differ from sentencing factors. 92
Justice Scalia concluded that the facts at issue in Monge were
technically elements of the offense, not mere sentencing factors.93
Justice Scalia's dissent questioned whether state legislatures
generally distinguish between facts that constitute elements of the
offense and those that constitute sentencing factors.94 Further, he
argued that in delineating between offense elements and sentencing
factors, the Court has relied solely on legislative labels. 95 As a result,
Justice Scalia asserted that a state could theoretically substitute all of
the crimes in its penal code with the single offense, " 'knowingly
causing injury to another,' bearing a penalty of 30 days in prison, but
subject to a series of 'sentencing enhancements' authorizing
additional punishments up to life imprisonment or death on the basis
of various levels of mens rea, severity of injury, and other
surrounding circumstances." 96 With this illustration, Justice Scalia
suggested re-examination of these labels, stressing that the majority's
acceptance of legislative determinants of what constitutes an offense
potentially circumvents a defendant's constitutional protections.97
Although Justice Scalia did not specifically accuse California's Three
Strikes laws of such beguilement, he described its sentencing
enhancements as indistinguishable from separate crimes and thus a
first step in dispensing with constitutional rights.98
91. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).
92. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. See id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 2255-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. See iL at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872)).
97. See id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9& See id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited the enhancement in
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(a) (West 1982): "'[A]ny person who personally uses a
firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony shall... be punished by an
additional term of imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years,' "
comparing the California Code's language to the federal provision set out in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Justice Scalia noted that Congress treats the same
"enhancement elements" as a separate crime: "'[w]hoever, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition
to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be
sentenced to imprisonment for five years.' " Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2256 (Scalia, J.,
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Justice Scalia also expressed his dissatisfaction with the holding
in Almendarez-Torres that a sentence increase from two to eighteen
years was not a separate offense conviction that demanded
constitutional procedural protections.99 Acknowledging that his
dissent in Monge would contradict the majority in Almendarez-
Torres, Justice Scalia argued that Almendarez-Torres was a "grave
constitutional error affecting the most fundamental of rights."1 ' His
dissent pointed out that the Almendarez-Torres Court had not
decided whether sentence-increasing enhancements that do not
involve a defendant's prior history are valid. 01  In applying his
broader assertion that elements of an offense are too often being
masked as sentencing elements, Justice Scalia argued that the
increase of Monge's sentence based on prior facts equaled the
conviction of a new crime.m Therefore, Monge's conviction under
the Three Strikes law was unconstitutional because the holding of the
California Court of Appeal-that insufficient evidence existed to
convict Monge-triggered double jeopardy protections.10 3
In examining Monge and whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
should apply to California's Three Strikes law, it is important to
examine the history and nature of the legislation. Over the past
twenty years, there has been a movement to "get tough" on crime
across the country.'0 4 In California, legislators responded to their
constituents' desires to increase punishment for criminals by passing a
Three Strikes law. 5 Section 667 of the California Penal Code was
enacted in 1994, in response to two high-profile murders committed
by different recidivists.'06 The two tiers of section 667 aim to increase
dissenting) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(a)).
99. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I ... concluded that it was a
grave and doubtful question whether the Constitution permits a fact that increases the
maximum sentence to which defendant is exposed to be treated as sentencing
enhancement rather than an element of a criminal offense."); Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1233 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102- See id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 2257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A
National Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16, 16.
105. See McClain, supra note 30, at 104. California's Three Strikes law was modeled in
part on Washington State statutes. See id. at 103-10; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.92.090 (West 1994) (requiring minimum ten years incarceration upon conviction of
second felony, third misdemeanor, or third petit larcency).
106. See Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion:
California's Three Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAuL L. REv. 615, 619-20 (1998). The
Polly Klaas and Kimber Reynolds murders, in 1993 and 1992 respectively, were the
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impetus for the law. See id. Both victims' fathers were heavily involved in the lobbying
process, with Mike Reynolds as the figurehead. See Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and
the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643,
1653-60 (1997) (describing the lobbying efforts of Mike Reynolds); Cowart, supra, at 626
(discussing the Three Strikes law as a reaction to senseless murders and the public
pressures that resulted in the California Penal Code additions); see also infra notes 288-89
and accompanying text (detailing the public pressure and lobbying efforts behind Three
Strikes legislation).
The impetus behind California's Three Strikes law buttresses the argument that
section 667 is the unconstitutional result of populist fear and passion, See Turner et al.,
supra note 103, at 16; Cowart, supra note 104, at 626-27; McClain, supra note 30, at 101-08,
aimed to take sentencing power from a criminal justice system perceived as soft and
ineffective. See Cowart, supra, at 626. Cowart describes how the Three Strikes movement
emerged at a time of general fear when people felt out of control due to gun violence, drug
dealers, and gangs. See id. In response to a fearful public, legislative and presidential
campaigns focused on various Three Strikes proposals. See id. at 627. President Clinton
signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the federal version
of Three Strikes legislation, inspiring many states, including California, to follow suit. See
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Cowart, supra, at 627.
President Clinton has since rescinded his support of the Act and has voiced his desire to
narrow its scope. See Cowart, supra, at 627.
Movement for this legislative change to the system occurred after the murder of
seventeen-year-old Kimber Reynolds by a recidivist named Joe Davis. See Vitiello, supra,
at 1653. The victim's father, Mike Reynolds, informed California Governor Pete Wilson
that he was "'going after these guys in a big way, the kind of people who would murder
little girls in this way.' " d (quoting the victim's father). Soon after, Reynolds lobbied
California state legislators to sponsor the original Three Strikes legislation, organized four
buses of supporters for the first hearing of the bill, and spoke at the hearing in favor of the
bill. See id. at 1654. To draft the original Three Strikes legislation, "Reynolds solicited the
assistance of James Ardaiz, the presiding justice for California's Fifth District Court of
Appeal." Id Later, "Reynolds prevailed on Bill Jones, then a Republican assemblyman
from Fresno, to sponsor Assembly Bill 971 (A.B. 971). Jones enlisted Democratic
Assemblyman Jim Costa for support in the then Democratically controlled legislature."
Id. Although the first version of the bill did not pass, Reynolds, with money from the
National Rifle Association and public sympathy aroused by Polly Klaas's murder-
kidnapping by a repeat offender, started the voter initiation process. See id. at 1655-56.
Twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was murdered by a recidivist named Richard Allen Davis.
See id. The public realized that a Three Strikes law would have saved Polly, in part
because her family "humanized" her by publicly playing a videotape of her and by forming
the Polly Klaas Foundation to "keep her in the public eye." Id.
According to the California Constitution, voter initiation of a bill requires five
percent of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election-in this case, almost 385,000
signatures. See CAL. CONST. art. H, § 8(b); Vitiello, supra note 106, at 1655. Reynolds
garnered 50,000 signatures for the bill's petition, which, while not enough to get the bill on
the ballot, were sufficient to catch the attention of the legislature. See Vitiello, supra note
106, at 1656. The legislature listened to the message from its constituents and passed the
bill, despite obvious flaws. See id at 1657-58. Critics mentioned the following as flaws
with the proposed legislation: it did not include the option for life without parole and it
would be cruel and unusual punishment for defendants. See id. at 1658 n.79. Reynolds
commanded the attention of the legislature by stressing that it was an election year. See
id. at 1659. Legislators were sufficiently afraid of voter wrath to want to avoid "'being
denounced as trying to subvert [Reynold's] initiative.'" Id. (quoting Senator Quentin
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sentences for convicted criminals with prior arrests by automatically
sentencing repeat felons to life upon their third felony conviction.'l
The first tier of section 667 directly affects those convicted felons
who have one prior felony conviction on their record, regardless of
the jurisdiction in which they committed the previous felony.0 For
second-time felony offenders, section 667 mandates that a five-year
enhancement penalty be added to each sentence imposed for the
instant crime, with the sentence and the enhancement running
consecutively. 0 9 If the conviction at issue encompasses more than
one crime, consecutive sentences and enhancements are imposed for
each conviction.110 For example, if an offender is convicted of both
armed robbery and murder as part of the same offense, she would be
sentenced consecutively for these crimes, and a ten-year enhancement
penalty would be added to the sentence."'
The second tier of section 667 applies to convicted felons with
two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions." 2 This
provision differs, however, from the first tier in the severity of the
sentence imposed for a third felony conviction." 3  For the thrice
Kopp). See generally id. at 1658-59 (describing how Reynolds's power was an anomaly
and how state senators were easily threatened by Reynolds and his refusal to settle for a
more focused bill). When addressing the Senate Committee, Reynolds argued to
discourage the Committee from amending the bill: "'When we start adding amendments
... it's going to open a Pandora's box .... It will also demonstrate to me at least the
inability of the legislature to act in a responsible way.' " Id at 1659 (quoted in Dan
Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at Al). As noted later
by a one-time supporter of the bill, Mike Klaas, the father of murder victim Polly,
"'[w]hat's driving Mike [Reynolds] is his passion .... Mike doesn't want to be reasoned
with.'" Id at 1659 (quoted in Dan Morain, "Three Strikes" A Steam Roller Driven by
One Man's Pain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A3); see also id. ("After studying the
alternatives [to 'three strikes' proposed by various legislators], Klaas withdrew support for
A.B. 971 because it put too many nonviolent criminals behind bars."). Wounded families
of victims, a scared public, and powerful lobbyists created a Three Strikes law with little
reflection on the law's eventual effects on the criminal justice system or whether its
application would be successful. See id. at 1661-63 (describing the role of other political
players, such as the National Criminal Justice Commission ("NCIC"), the California
Correctional Peace Officers Association ("CCPOA"), and Governor Pete Wilson, and
focusing on CCPOA interest in the bill's passage because it increased the size of prisons,
thereby generating more work for CCPOA members). The Legislature ignored the
financial and practical flaws of the bill and passed the bill out of the desire to please its
constituents. See id. at 1664, 1666-68 (describing the extent of the Senate's knowledge of
the bill's excesses and the existence of better bills).
107. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 620-21.
10& See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1999).
109. See id.
110. See icL § 667(a)(1).
111. See id.
112- See id. § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1999) (describing "violent" felonies).
113. See id. § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
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convicted felon, an indeterminate life sentence is imposed. 4 The
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is the greatest of the
following three possibilities: (1) three times the sentence for the
current felony conviction; (2) state imprisonment for twenty-five
years; or (3) the sentence as determined by the court for the instant
conviction, plus any applicable enhancements pursuant to section
1170 of the California Penal Code. 15 At a minimum, the thrice
convicted felon can be assured of a sentence of twenty-five years to
life."6 Because the statute calls for the greatest penalty, the third-
time sentence often results in life imprisonment."7
To assess the Supreme Court's determination of whether the
Three Strikes law triggers double jeopardy protections, it is necessary
to consider the situations in which the Court has applied the Clause."'
Based on the English common law notion that a defendant should be
protected from experiencing" 'jeopardy of life' "more than once, the
Double Jeopardy Clause historically protected individuals against
being tried numerous times for the same offense.'19 The rule is
grounded in the belief that the State should not be able to repeatedly
seek the criminal conviction of an individual and consequently subject
that individual to embarrassment, anxiety, and a greater chance of
conviction despite innocence. °  In theory, the Double Jeopardy
Clause makes the following three situations unconstitutional: (1) " 'a
second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal;' " (2) " 'a
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction;' " and (3)
"'multiple punishments for the same offense.' 1121 The Court,
however, has wavered in determining the scope of double jeopardy
applications. In addition, uncertainty as to what comprises acquittal,
conviction, and offenses has complicated the application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Court initially limited double jeopardy from applying to
cases in which the appellant moves for a new trial,"z even when the
114. See id.
115. See id. § 667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
116. See id § 667(e)(2)(A)(ii).
117. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 623-24 nn.22-34.
118. See infra notes 119-89 and accompanying text (providing discussion of case law
involving Double Jeopardy Clause application).
119. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335).
120. See id at 187-88; see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
569 (1977) (tracing the history and background of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
121. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (quoting North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)).
122- See Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905) (holding that when the
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defendant was subject to capital punishment, as in Stroud v. United
States."z  Eventually, in Burks v. United States," the Court held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause protects reversals based on insufficient
evidence but does not protect reversals due to trial error.'25
With the advent of sentencing statutes,'126 however, courts have
appellant invokes the writ of error that requires a new trial, the plaintiff "waives ... his
right to avail himself of the former acquittal of the greater offense").
123. 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919). In Stroud, a unanimous Court extended Trono to capital
cases by holding that when a conviction of first-degree murder with capital punishment
was reversed due to error, vacated, and then reinstated after retrial, the defendant was not
protected against the latter conviction because he was the party requesting the new trial.
See iL The petitioner in Monge pointed to Stroud as evidence that a capital sentence does
not automatically trigger double jeopardy protections. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2253.
124. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
125. With its decision in Burks, the Court acknowledged the policy behind the Double
Jeopardy Clause by highlighting the Clause's objective of protecting against "successive
trials" and noting that its past decisions did not necessarily further that goal. Burks, 437
U.S. at 11; see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not permit "the State ... to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense [because] [t]he constitutional prohibition
against 'double jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to
the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense"); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 328 (1957) (implying that new trials are the answers to
insufficient evidence regardless of whether the defendant was the movant for the new
trial); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950) (holding that "[w]here the accused
successfully seeks review of a conviction, there is no double jeopardy upon a new trial"
regardless of what prompted reversal). The Burks Court pointed to United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896), as the "logical starting point for unraveling the conceptual confusion"
of Double Jeopardy application. Burks, 437 U.S. at 13. The Court noted that in Ball,
reversal was based on trial error and not a lack of evidence. See id. at 14. The Court
stressed the need for future clarification and consistency between its decisions and the
policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause, but noted that the failure of proof must result
in the impossibility of a guilty verdict as a matter of law. See id. at 12-15 (holding that
society could not handle every accused being immune from punishment after any trial
error); see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 341 (1975) ("It would be a high price
indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because
of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to
conviction."). Burks secured the application of double jeopardy protections to reversals
because of insufficient evidence but not reversals due to trial error. See Burks, 437 U.S. at
12-15.
126. An examination of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, mandated in 1984, shows
the trend towards satisfying public desire to eradicate crime by creating stricter sentences.
See Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 414-15 (1992). Congress
mandated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This
Act codified the notion that judges should consider the following "purposes" above and
beyond the crime elements when sentencing a criminal defendant: adherence to a fair
punishment, deterrence from further crimes, deterrence from further crimes committed by
the defendant, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994).
Some states have also incepted statutes to extend the sentences of repeat offenders.
See Nkechi Taifa, "Three Strikes-and-You're Out"---Mandatory Life Imprisonment for
Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 717, 718 (1995); McClain, supra note 30, at
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been forced to assess the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause
to sentencing proceedings." Initially, the Supreme Court was
reluctant to extend double jeopardy protections to sentence
enhancements.
In North Carolina v. Pearce,128 the Court examined whether the
Constitution prohibited the granting of more severe punishment after
resentencing when the original conviction is overturned.129 The Court
held that more severe punishment was not unconstitutional so long as
the judge clarified the reasons for the sentence extension.130  The
Court's opinion addressed two specific cases."' In the first case,
Pearce's initial conviction of assault with attempt to rape was
reversed. 32 Upon retrial, Pearce was reconvicted and sentenced to
eight years longer than his original sentence. 33 The federal district
court reversed Pearce's resentencing, 4 and both the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court affirmed his release, agreeing that the state
court failed to justify its decision to increase the sentence.'35 In the
second case, Rice's conviction for second-degree burglary was
overturned because he had not received his constitutional right to
counsel.136 After being convicted in a retrial, Rice was sentenced to
twenty-five years, a term substantially longer than his original
sentence. 137 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision to
credit Rice with prison time already served, holding that the state of
Alabama did not sufficiently explain the change in sentence
100-03. In addition to California, three other states-Washington, Texas, and Illinois-
passed Three Strikes statutes during the late 1970s to the early 1990s. See McClain, supra
note 30, at 103-07.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997) (per curiam); Arizona v.
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 205 (1984); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980); Bell
v. State, 622 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Ind. 1993).
128. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
129. See id. at 713.
130. See id. at 726.
131. The Court combined these two cases on the basis of their "related but analytically
separate issues." Id. at 715. One case involved the "constitutional limitations upon the
imposition of a more severe punishment after conviction for the same offense upon
retrial," while the other case involved "the more limited question whether, in computing
the new sentence, the Constitution requires that credit must be given for that part of the
original sentence already served." Id. at 715-16. The Court noted that Pearce only
addressed the first question. See id.
132. See id. at 713-14.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726; Pearce v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 253, 253 (4th Cir.
1968) (per curiam).
136. See id. at 714.
137. See id.
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duration." 8 The Court ultimately held that the resentencings of
Pearce and Rice were unconstitutional because of this lack of
explanation. 39 The Court failed to hold that the Double Jeopardy
clause barred Pearce's resentencing, and thus its decision had
implications beyond its holding.40 The majority opinion in Pearce
reasoned that reconviction was not a violation of double jeopardy
because the "slate [is] wiped clean" after a defendant's conviction is
put aside.141 The Court relied on precedent that double jeopardy does
not protect a defendant whose first conviction has been set aside 42
The Court cited Stroud for the proposition that any "legally
138. See id. at 726.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 143 (1980) (examining
resentencing); Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J.
1807, 1835 (1997) (noting that the Pearce Court refused to apply double jeopardy analysis
and instead chose to apply a due process vindictiveness approach); James A.
Shellenberger & James A. Strazella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the
Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 MARQ.
L. REV. 1, 120 (1995) (providing Pearce as an example of the Court's attempts to "distill
the meaning and application of the Double Jeopardy Clause"); Stephen G. Murphy, Jr.,
Comment, Limits on Enhanced Sentences Following Appeal and Retrial: Has Pearce Been
Pierced?, 19 CoNN. L. REv. 973, 975 (1987) (noting that the Court's analysis held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not restrict a sentence's length when the sentence was
handed down on reconviction).
In its decision, the Pearce majority acknowledged that its reasoning was based in part
on the public policy argument that a safe society requires the possibility of reconviction.
See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721 n.18 (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the majority's
reasoning was flawed because Pearce was indistinguishable from Green, in which the
Court held that a defendant convicted of a lesser offense that is eventually reversed cannot
be retried for a greater offense. See id. at 745 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 185 (1957)). Based on Green, Justice
Harlan stated that a defendant who has been convicted and sentenced should not be
placed in jeopardy of receiving a greater punishment. See id. (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan wrote that disabling the second judge from
handing down a longer sentence on retrial compromised a "societal interest." Id. at 750
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted, however, that the aim of
the compromise is "protect other societal interests, and it is, after Green, a compromise
compelled by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice White concurred, stating that an increased sentence should be
based on new information given to a trial judge since the time of the first sentencing. See
id. at 751 (White, J., concurring in part).
The same day the Court decided Pearce, it held in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), that the Fifth Amendment applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id at 787. The Benton Court also held that the Fifth Amendment requires that good
time credits be applied from the first sentencing to the second sentencing based on the
Fifth Amendment's protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. See id.
141. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721.
142. See id. at 719-20.
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authorized" sentence may be applied in the event of a reconviction143
In DiFrancesco v. United States,'" another case limiting the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentence
enhancements, the Court upheld Pearce and held that the Organized
Crime Control Act ("OCCA")'45 provision allowing the government
to appeal a "dangerous special offender's" sentence does not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.146 The OCCA provides a definition of
"dangerous special offender" and both authorizes courts to increase
the sentence of anyone falling within the definition and permits the
government to appeal the sentence for a higher court to review.147 In
DiFrancesco, the defendant was convicted of racketeering and
sentenced to nine years in prison. 48 One month after his initial
sentencing, the government labeled the defendant a "dangerous
special offender" under OCCA, and consequently, the court
increased his term to two ten-year concurrent terms. 49 DiFrancesco
appealed, and the Second Circuit overturned the government's
resentencing on the grounds that it violated double jeopardy. 50 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the case's constitutional
significance.'5' DiFrancesco posed the question of whether a criminal
sentence has the same finality as an acquittal.152 After taking into
account the evolution of sentencing practices, previous Supreme
143. Id. at 720 (citing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 16 (1919)).
144. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
145. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,84 Stat. 922, 922-62
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1998)).
146. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 117. The Court focused on two aspects of the Double
Jeopardy Clause: the guarantee against multiple punishments and the guarantee against
multiple trials. See id. at 126-31.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b), (e), (f) (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98
Stat. 1987 (1984). In addition, OCCA allows the United States to appeal that sentence in
the circuit courts of appeal. See ic § 3576.
148. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 122.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 126 (holding that subjecting" 'a defendant to the risk of substitution of a
greater sentence' upon an appeal by the government, is to place him a second time 'in
jeopardy of life or limb.'" (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 783 (2d
Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 117 (1980)).
151. See id. at 122-23.
152. See id. at 120-21. In discussing the importance and finality of acquittal, the Court
noted that when the trial does not result in acquittal, has been terminated prior to a
verdict on grounds other than conviction, or has yielded a conviction that has been set
aside, the government may prosecute again. See id. at 130-31 (citing Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514-16 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-11
(1976); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 459 (1973)). The only clear exception to retrial,
according to the Court, occurs when a conviction has been set aside because of a lack of
evidence to convict the defendant. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 131.
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Court rulings, and double jeopardy policy, the Court held that
criminal sentencing does not trigger double jeopardy protections.5 3
The Supreme Court consistently resisted application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing enhancements until Bullington
v. Missouri.'" In Bullington, the Court held that a Missouri statute
implementing a capital sentencing hearing structured as a trial of guilt
or innocence triggered double jeopardy restrictions.55 The Missouri
statute at issue in Bullington aimed to provide procedural protections
to the defendant, including separate guilt and sentencing trials. 6
153. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132-38. First, the Court distinguished between
acquittals and sentences. See id. at 137-38. After drawing a parallel to the holding in
Pearce that the imposition of a new longer sentence after a retrial does not violate double
jeopardy, the Court stated that the difference between a new trial and an appeal of the
sentence is no more than a "'conceptual nicety.'" Id. at 135-36 (quoting North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989));
see also supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (describing the holding and reasoning
in Pearce). The Court also discounted any ill effects of an appealed sentence, reasoning
that after a guilty finding, an increase in sentence will not cause anxiety, harassment, or
any of the other effects against which the Double Jeopardy Clause aims to protect. See
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-37. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, attacked this reasoning,
claiming that the Court could not believe that the sentencing phase was "merely incidental
and that defendants do not suffer acute anxiety. To the convicted defendant, the
sentencing phase is certainly as critical as the guilt-innocence phase. To pretend otherwise
as a reason for holding 18 U.S.C § 3576 valid is to ignore reality." Id. at 150 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court also stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not entitle a
defendant to know the exact limit of his punishment. See id. at 137.
Next, the Court examined whether the statute violated double jeopardy protections
against multiple punishment. See id. at 138. The Court disagreed with the appeals court,
holding that there can be no "expectation of finality" in the sentence because Congress
created a statute that clearly and pointedly enables the lengthening of a sentence. Id. at
139. Finally, the Court held that a sentence enhancement could not be analogized to a
second trial because the statute states that an appeals court may only increase the sentence
upon a trial court's legal error. See id. at 141. The statute is therefore constitutional
because of the limited review it allows. See id.
The four dissenting Justices reasoned that the majority erred in judgment by
miscalculating "the appropriate degree of finality to be accorded the imposition of
sentence by the trial judge." Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent articulated
the similarities between acquittals and sentences in an attempt to show that the majority's
reasoning was unpersuasive. See id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Also, the dissent
found fault with the majority's logic that the policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause,
eradicating embarrassment and anxiety, see supra note 153 and accompanying text, did not
apply to enhancing sentences, see DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 149-50 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent claimed that the statute yields unconstitutional multiple
punishments. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting Justice
Harlan's dissent in Pearce, in which he argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause should
apply equally to sentencing provisions as they are indistinguishable from "offenses").
154. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
155. See id. at 446-47.
156. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.006.2 (1978); Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433; see also Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.001 (stating that "[a]ny person who unlawfully, willfully, knowingly,
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Under the statute, the same jury was required for both proceedings
and was responsible for considering mitigating and aggravating
factors in its decision.5 7 While the evidence allowed at the sentencing
proceeding could be "additional," it had to have been known to the
defendant before the trial began.5 8 In Bullington, the State had
informed the defendant before trial that it would seek the death
penalty and that there were two aggravating factors it intended to
present to the jury.'59 After a guilty verdict, however, the jury
sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.6 The trial court
denied the defendant's motion for an acquittal but granted him a new
trial on other grounds.'x ' The prosecution then served a "Notice of
Evidence in Aggravation," stating that the prosecution still intended
to seek capital punishment using the same aggravating factors it had
introduced to the defense prior to the first trial. 162 The defense
argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause made a second attempt at a
death sentence impossible. 6 The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the death penalty issue could be retried,164 and the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 65 The Court also noted that previous
decisions recognized various due process protections for defendants
at sentencing hearings resembling trials of guilt or innocence. 66
Concluding that the sentencing proceeding in the defendant's first
trial "was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence," the
Court held that constitutional double jeopardy protections should be
applied to his second trial. 67
deliberately, and with premeditation kills or causes the killing of another human being is
guilty of the offense of capital murder").
157. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.006.2; Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433-34.
158. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006.
159. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 435. The two aggravating factors that the prosecution
intended to prove were: "'[t]he offense was committed by a person ... who has a
substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions' ... and ... '[t]he offense was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity
of mind.' " Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.012.2(1), (7)).
160. See id. at 435-36.
161. See id. at 436. Bullington was one of 80 Missouri cases granting a new trial as a
result of Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), in which the Court struck down a
Missouri law exempting female jurors from service, see id. at 370. For further discussion of
Bullington, see John A. Chatzky, Comment, Extending Double Jeopardy Protections to
Sentencing: Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), 20 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 127, 129
(1982).
162. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
163. See id.
164. See Bullington v. Missouri, 459 S.W.2d 334,341 (Mo. 1970).
165. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 437.
166. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
167. Id. Although the retrial in Bullington was necessary because of trial error, the
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The Court concluded that the Missouri statute did not allow the
trial court to determine whether there were additional facts
warranting the death penalty after the jury had previously sentenced
the defendant to life without possibility of parole.168 The Court held
that the State had already "received 'one fair opportunity to offer
whatever proof it could assemble'" and could not ask for another.'69
Prior to Bullington, the Court had held that the granting of a less-
than-maximum sentence was not an "acquittal" and did not preclude
the imposition of a greater sentence.70 The Court distinguished
Bullington from these prior decisions on two grounds. First,
Bullington involved a separate sentencing procedure in which the
sentencer had complete discretion.' Second, the nature of the
Court declined to extend the Stroud Court's holding that double jeopardy protections do
not apply to trial error reversals. See id.; Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919).
The Court's reasoning relied on both the capital nature of the sentencing and the
sentencing's similarity to a trial of guilt or innocence. See id. Justice Powell dissented and
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. See id. at 447
(Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent's argument followed the line of pre-Bullington cases
denying that a sentencing statute's procedure should trigger constitutional protections.
See id. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent also claimed that the question should
not be whether the sentencing procedure is close to a trial of guilt or innocence but rather
"whether the reasons for considering an acquittal on guilt or innocence ... apply equally
to a sentencing decision imposing less than the most severe sentence authorized by law."
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stressed the difference between sentencing and
acquittal, noting that the death sentence is legal and thus should not be granted any
further double jeopardy protections than any other sentences. See id. at 451-52 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The dissent noted other requirements of the death penalty, conceding that
"[t]he death sentence, of course, is unlike any other punishment. For that reason, this
Court has read the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to require that States prescribe unique procedural safeguards to protect
against capricious or discriminatory impositions of the death sentence." Id. at 451 (Powell,
J., dissenting); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the death penalty does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
in all circumstances); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
applies to the death penalty).
168. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433-34,446.
169. Id. at 446 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,16 (1978)).
170. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138-39; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35
(1973); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,723 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith,
490 U.S. 794 (1989); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15,18 (1919).
171. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433. According to the Court, "highly pertinent
differences" existed between the Missouri procedures controlling in Bullington and the
ones recognized as constitutional in DiFrancesco. Id. at 440. The Court noted that in
DiFrancesco, the federal procedures "include[d] appellate review of a sentence 'on the
record of the sentencing court,' ... not a de novo proceeding that gives the Government
the opportunity to convince a second factfinder of its view of the facts. Id (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3576 (1970)). The Court further stated that "the choice presented to the federal
judge under § 3575 is far broader than that faced by the state jury at the present
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capital proceeding at issue in Bullington required double jeopardy
protections. 72
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun held that double
jeopardy bars retrial of an acquitted defendant but not resentencing
for a harsher term.73 According to the majority, Bullington's capital
sentencing procedure could be distinguished from a mere
resentencing because the jury was given two choices-life
imprisonment or death-and the prosecution had the burden of
establishing facts beyond a reasonable doubt.74 In short, the
sentencing proceeding was structurally identical to the trial on guilt or
innocence that had immediately preceded it: "It was itself a trial on
the issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri
statutes."'175
Justice Blackmun distinguished Bullington from Stroud v. United
States,76 North Carolina v. Pearce,77 and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,78
three cases in which the Court had held that resentencing did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 179 The Bullington Court also
differentiated Bullington from DiFrancesco, which, like Bullington,
had involved a bifurcated jury trial. 80 Thus, the Court held that the
petitioner's trial." Id.
172. See id. at 446. In addressing the capital sentencing issue, the Court re-examined
Stroud, in which it had allowed a new trial and death conviction--changed from a life
sentence-for a prisoner after the Solicitor General admitted trial error. See id. at 431-32;
Stroud, 251 U.S. at 18; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that heightened procedural
protections are required for capital defendants).
173. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 437-38; see also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117, 133, 137-38 (1980) (holding that a defendant's resentencing does not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23-24 (1973) (same);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490
U.S. 794 (1989) (same); Stroud, 251 U.S. at 17-18 (same).
174. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438.
175. Id.; see also id. at 438 n.10 (explaining the extent to which a pre-sentence hearing
resembles a trial).
176. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
177. 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
178. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
179. The majority opinion in Bullington stressed two differences: first, in those three
cases, the sentencing procedures were not like trials, with standards of reasonable doubt
and mitigating or aggravating factors allowed into evidence; and second, there were no
statutory standards of guidance. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438-39. In the three prior
cases, the factfinder was given broad discretion and provided with no standards or
guidelines for sentencing. See Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 23-24; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723; Stroud,
251 U.S. at 18.
180. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439. The Court relied on three factors. First, the
statute in DiFrancesco gave a second factfinder the chance to review the sentence "on the
record of the sentencing court," not a de novo proceeding that allows the government to
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Missouri statute triggered double jeopardy protections. 18' The
majority further reasoned that the nature of the death penalty
requires double jeopardy protections in capital sentencing
proceedings'n because of the risk of subjecting a defendant to grave
stress and insecurity. 83
In Arizona v. Rumsey," the Court reinforced its Bullington
holding in yet another examination of the application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to a resentencing proceeding involving capital
punishment. Rumsey raised the issue of whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from a death sentence after a
life sentence is set aside on appeal.18s Justice O'Connor, writing for
argue to a different factfinder as in Bullington. Id. at 441. Second, the factfinder was
given a broader choice of sentencing options in DiFrancesco, not just two as in Bullington
(life or death). See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976) (providing that if a defendant is
sentenced as a special offender, he may be sentenced to "an appropriate term not to
exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term
otherwise authorized by law for such felony"). Third, in DiFrancesco, the standard was
"preponderance of the evidence," not "reasonable doubt" as in Bullington. See
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 441. Therefore, the Missouri statute examined in Bullington
triggered double jeopardy protections because under the statute, capital sentencing was
treated like a trial as to guilt or innocence, whereas the Court categorized the statute at
issue in DiFrancesco as clearly governing sentencing proceedings. See id. at 446.
181. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
182. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (listing the goals of the Double
Jeopardy Clause: saving the defendant embarrassment, stress, expense, and insecurity).
183. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445-46. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that Pearce
and its progeny allow defendants to be retried after a court overturns their convictions.
See id. at 442. The majority in Pearce reasoned that "the slate has been wiped clean. The
conviction has been set aside, and the unexpired portion of the original sentence will never
be served.". Pearce v. North Carolina, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969), overruled by Alabama v.
Smithi 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Justice Blackmun also noted the exception that a defendant
may not be retried if her conviction was reversed on grounds of insufficient evidence. See
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442-43; see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978)
("Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal ... it is
difficult to conceive how society has greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on
review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a
verdict of guilty."); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (holding that a retrial
of the first-degree murder charge was precluded by double jeopardy protections because
the defendant "was forced to run the gauntlet once on that charge and the jury refused to
convict him"). Justice Blackmun reasoned that the sentencing proceedings were in trial
form, so the reasonable proof burden may result in insufficient evidence to convict. See
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 444-45 ("By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles
a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, however, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to
determine whether the prosecution has 'proved its case.' "). Therefore, the initial jury
determination of life imprisonment was susceptible to the same values and logic that
underlie the notion that a "verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is ...
absolutely final." Id. at 445.
184. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
185. See id. at 205. After a jury found Rumsey guilty of armed robbery and first-degree
murder, the trial judge held a separate proceeding that weighed mitigating and
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the Court, noted that Arizona's death penalty sentencing proceeding
resembled Missouri's proceeding in its similarity to a trial."6 The
Court held that the trial court's initial decision of a non-capital
sentence should have been treated as an "acquittal on the merits"
that barred retrial on the capital punishment issue." In addition, the
Court held that even though the trial court's original decision was
based on an erroneous interpretation of the statute, "reliance on an
error of law ... does not change the double jeopardy effects of a
judgment that amounts to an acquittal on the merits" because while
the error "affects the accuracy of the determination [,]... it does not
alter its essential character."'" In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justice White, claimed that Rumsey could be distinguished from
Bullington because the trial judge's decision in Rumsey targeted a
specific issue-whether "certain specified aggravating factors"
existed-and was not based on a full trial. 8 9
It appears sentencing has begun to overwhelm the actual
criminal offense. Decisions concerning sentencing statutes point to
the possibility that courts may disguise additional convictions as
aggravating circumstances to determine the defendant's sentence. See id. The trial court
misinterpreted the aggravating circumstances under Arizona's capital sentencing scheme
and erroneously held that statutory requirements prohibited it from imposing capital
punishment. See id. at 206-07; see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (West Supp.
1983-84) (barring the death penalty when no aggravating factors are present). The
defendant appealed his sentence of consecutive 21 and 25 year terms, claiming the
sentences violated federal and state law. See Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 206. On remand, the
trial court handed down a death sentence in accordance with the correct interpretation of
the Arizona statute. See id. at 208 ("The court also found that none of the five statutory
mitigating circumstances was present and that the fact that the murder conviction was for
felony murder, if a mitigating circumstance at all, was not sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency."). Upon the defendant's appeal of the death penalty, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that under Bullington the trial court's decision violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this decision, drawing a parallel
between Bullington and Rumsey. See id. at 212-13.
186. See Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 209-10. For example, "[t]he sentencer-the trial judge in
Arizona-is required to choose between two options: death, and life imprisonment
without possibility of parole for 25 years." Id. Additional similarities include the
sentencer's adherence to "statutory standards" that "define aggravating and mitigating
circumstances," the "usual rules of evidence" that dictate whether aggravating and
mitigating factors may be introduced into the hearing, and the standard of proof of
reasonable doubt. Id. at 210. The usual rules of evidence require that the state prove the
existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703(E).
187. Rumsey, 467 U. S. at 211.
188. Id
189. Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent also concluded that if the Court
had reversed the verdict and had given the defendant the death penalty regardless of the




sentence enhancements; in addition to endangering a criminal
defendant's right to double jeopardy protections, sentencing statutes
also threaten circumvention of other constitutional protections.190
Although the Court's holdings offer little precedent for incorporating
constitutional protections into sentencing statutes, various opinions
have noted that the rationale behind protecting criminal defendants
has been obscured by the replacement of "charge offense
sentencing"--punishing based on the convicted offense with "real
offense sentencing"191-- the label given to the adjustment of a
defendant's punishment based on his "conduct in a particular case."'
Two cases have discussed whether statutes violated other clauses
of the Constitution by substituting offense elements with sentencing
factors. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,19' the Court acknowledged that
a sentencing statute enacted for the purpose of being "a tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense" would trigger due process
protections and require a reasonable doubt burden of proof rather
190. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1237 (1998) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted: "No one can read McMillan without
learning that the Court was open to the argument that the Constitution requires a fact
which does increase the available sentence to be treated as an element of the crime." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He also stated that "[i]f all that were not enough, there must be
added the fact that many State Supreme Courts have concluded that a prior conviction
which increases maximum punishment must be treated as an element of the offense under
either their state constitutions, ... or as a matter of common law." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a state legislature may not "dispense" with procedural
protections for proving conduct resulting in "severe criminal penalties"). Justice Stevens
cautioned that after McMillan, state legislation may define the criminal offenses with
which a defendant can be charged, as well as "authoritatively determine that the conduct
so described, i.e., the prohibited activity which subjects the defendant to criminal
sanctions-is not an element of the crime which the Due Process Clause requires to be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
191. See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1233 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court is addressing the challenging question "whether the Constitution requires a fact
which substantially increases the maximum permissible punishment for a crime to be
treated as an element of the crime" and concluding that "on the basis of our prior law, in
fact, the answer was considerably doubtful"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V
(guaranteeing that no person "shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb"); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) (noting the
potential for a state to redefine "the elements that constitute different crimes,
characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment" and in doing
so undermine societal interest in constitutional protections afforded to a criminal
defendant); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that
"every factual consideration deemed relevant for sentencing purposes must be established
through a collateral, post-verdict adjudication at which the applicable procedural
protections are significantly lower than those applicable at the trial itself").
192. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098-99.
193. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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than whatever burden the statute required. 194 Although the McMillan
Court declined to define what would constitute a "tail wagging the
dog," in United States v. Kikumura 95 the Third Circuit held that a
sentence departure' 96 from the prescribed range of twenty-seven to
thirty-three months to a maximum of thirty years imprisonment
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offended reasonableness
and required greater procedural protections."9 The court held that
the statutorily prescribed preponderance standard for determining
sentence departures was "generally" constitutional, but it applied
McMillan's language to hold that the enormity of the sentence
enhancement required the burden of proof to be raised to clear and
convincing evidence.198  The Kikumura court recognized a
requirement that sentence departures be reasonable implicit in
statutory demands for justification for the departure'99 and stopped
short of proclaiming that the requirement for changing the standard
of proof in light of unreasonableness also was implicit in the Due
Process Clause.2°
The Kikumura court noted, however, that there were inherent
194. Id. at 88.
195. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
196. A judge's decision to adjust the presumptive guideline sentence because it does
not sufficiently respect the four purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is referred
to as a "sentence departure." See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1999). Under
§ 3553(b), a judge may depart from the guidelines based on "an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission." Id.; see also Miller, supra note 126, at 474-77 (discussing
whether judicial assessment of purpose is a sufficient reason for departure).
197. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1089. This departure purportedly was the "largest
departure from an applicable guideline range, in absolute or percentage terms, since the
sentencing guidelines became effective." Id. The defendant in Kikumura was traveling on
the New Jersey Turnpike with bombs, bomb paraphernalia, and a map of New York City
with three locations marked on it. See id. at 1095. Although the defendant was convicted
of passport and explosives offenses, see id. at 1089, the judge based his departure from the
sentencing guidelines on evidence of the defendant's previous terrorist activities, see id. at
1096, inferring that the defendant's past evidenced an intent to cause "multiple deaths and
serious injuries," id. at 1097.
19& See id. at 1101. The court explained, however, that it did not consider a standard
of proof higher than clear and convincing evidence because the defendant failed to request
a higher standard. See id. In addition, the court cited United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d
285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989), in which the court held that a preponderance standard is sufficient
to warrant adjustments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at
1101.
199. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (stating that
sentencing court may not depart from guidelines if circumstances relied upon to justify
departure were adequately considered by Sentencing Commission in formulating
guidelines).
200. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102.
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constitutional problems in any real offense sentencing system because
of the potential for "significant unfairness" whenever proceedings
determining "factual considerations deemed relevant for sentencing
purposes" contain fewer procedural protections than those given at
trial.2 1 Judge Rosenn's concurrence specifically named the Due
Process Clause as the source prohibiting such unfairness °.2  While the
Third Circuit provided a concrete illustration of when a sentence
enhancement strips a defendant of his constitutional protections,
other courts have not held that a specific sentencing statute triggers
greater procedural protections, despite recognition of potential
unfairness.203
A few months prior to hearing Monge, the Court heard
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,2'4 in which it debated whether an
eighteen year sentence increase was grave enough to be treated as a
separate offense conviction that demanded procedural protections
under the Constitution.2 5 The Court held that the increase should be
treated as a mere sentence enhancement and thus continued its
refusal to attach constitutional protections to a statutory sentencing
scheme.25 The Court reasoned that a section of the Immigrations and
Nationality Act07 did not define a "separate crime" but was merely
an enhancement20 8 based in part on it's the statute's language. 9 The
201. Id. at 1099.
202. See id. at 1119 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Judge Rosenn stated that, by increasing
the defendant's sentence, the Government "may have violated [his] right to due process"
because of the unconstitutionality of allowing a defendant's intent to be tried and proven
with less than full procedural protection. Id. at 1121 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Miner, 127 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 1997) (narrowing the
scope of Kikumura by holding that it could never apply to drug quantity determinations);
United States v. Ruggiero, 100 F.3d 284,290 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to adopt Kikumura's
holding and to apply a clear and convincing standard of proof to an increase from the 25 to
33 month range to 135 to 168 months); United States v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1323 (7th
Cir. 1995) (declining to apply Kikumura in one specific case but reserving opinion about
whether Kikumura will ever apply); United States v. Contreras-Matos, Nos. 92-10161, 92-
10200, 92-10241, 1993 WL 330754, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1993) (deciding against the
application of Kikumura because the sentence was not increased enough to be considered
the tail wagging the dog); United States v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383, 1385-87 (9th Cir. 1992)
(distinguishing Kikumura because the sentence enhancement at issue was not so extreme
and limiting Kikumura's application to sentence departures only).
204. 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998).
205. See id. at 1222.
206. See id.
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (1994) (authorizing a 20 year maximum sentence for
''any alien described" who was previously deported "subsequent to a conviction for
commission of aggravated felony").
208. Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1222.
209. Id. at 1225 ("Linguistically speaking, it seems more likely that Congress simply
meant to 'describe' an alien who... was guilty of a felony....").
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Court also reasoned that the statute's use of the term "offense" did
not prove that the section should not be interpreted as a "sentence
enhancement" because the statute also used the term "aggravated
felony" to refer to the increase.210 The Court further noted that a
sentence increase of such magnitude was "well within" limits of other
statutes held to be merely sentence enhancements by lower courts.2 11
Finally, the Court noted that the statute's "broad permissive
sentencing range" was not unfair because statutes providing
sentencing ranges have always required judicial discretion.212
Monge also examined whether the statute labeled offense
elements as sentencing factors. In asking whether California's Three
Strikes Law denied a defendant's constitutional protections, the
Court addressed three main issues.2 13 As noted by the Court, the
primary issue in Monge was whether the Buffington exception
granting double jeopardy protections to sentencing proceedings
applies to non-capital sentencing.2 4  Although the Court had
addressed application of double jeopardy to capital sentencing
proceedings,2 5 it had not definitively held whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause applies to non-capital cases until Monge 16  In
210. 1L at 1227.
211. See id. The Court cited a statute allowing a range of 5 to 40 years imprisonment
for distributing 100 kilograms of marijuana, but a maximum of 5 years for distributing 50
kilograms, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B), (D) (West Supp. 1999), and a statute
mandating 20 years imprisonment for distributing 100 grams of heroin, but life
imprisonment for distributing I kilogram or more, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (C).
212. Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1232-33.
213. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's claim
that sentencing statutes threaten Anglo-American jurisprudence principles).
214. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250; see also supra notes 154-83 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and holding of Bullington).
215. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 207 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430, 432 (1981); see also supra notes 154-89 and accompanying text (discussing the
holdings and reasoning of Rumsey and Bullington).
216. Prior to Monge, the Court had avoided the issue of whether double jeopardy
protections apply to non-capital sentencing proceedings. In Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.
383 (1994), the majority avoided the question of whether double jeopardy applied to a
non-capital sentencing proceeding that had trial-like need of evidence and burden of proof
by applying the Teague principle, which nullifies a habeas corpus suit. See id. at 395.
Justice Stevens dissented, claiming that Teague meant nothing and the offender statute in
question required due process protections, including the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id.
at 397-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A lower court, however, addressed the issue. See Bell
v. Indiana, 622 N.E.2d 450,451-52 (Ind. 1993).
In Bell, the Supreme Court of Indiana examined the Double Jeopardy Clause's
applicability after a conviction had been overturned due to trial error, as opposed to
insufficient evidence. See id. at 456. The issue in Bell was analogous to that in Rumsey:
both dealt with erroneous original verdicts. See Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 207; Bell, 622 N.E.2d
at 456. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, arrived at a different conclusion in Bell,
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deciding Monge, the Court moved away from the analytical approach
it had taken in Bullington, which looked to the existence of particular
protections as triggering the Double Jeopardy Clause. 17
The Monge Court acknowledged that the procedural protections
of California Penal Code section 667 mirror those of the Missouri
statute in Bullington in that they both resemble a trial of guilt or
innocence 18  The Court, however, downplayed the importance of
procedural structure, holding that despite procedure possessing the
"hallmarks" of a trial of guilt or innocence, the case did not
sufficiently resemble Bullington because that case was decided
primarily on the basis of its status as a capital punishment sentencing
presumably because the sentence involved was not a capital one. See Bell, 622 N.E.2d at
456. The court held that trial error resulted in the reversal of Bell's conviction and
habitual offender status and that "a defendant may be subjected to retrial in a habitual
offender proceeding in which the result in the first trial is vacated due to trial error rather
than evidence insufficiency." Id. In Bell, the defendant had been sentenced to concurrent
terms for robbery and battery that were enhanced by his habitual offender status under
the Indiana code. See id. at 451; see also IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-5-1, 35-42-2-1(3)
(West 1998) (providing the statutory guidelines for robbery and battery). Two of the
issues before the Supreme Court of Indiana were whether enough evidence existed to
support Bell's classification as a habitual offender and whether the error of admitting
Bell's confession made during discussion of a plea agreement triggered the requirement of
a new trial. See Bell, 622 N.E.2d at 451-52. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence to maintain Bell's enhanced status, and thus, double jeopardy did not preclude
retrial of the habitual offender issue. See id. (citing Perkins v. State, 542 N.E.2d 549 (Ind.
1989); Phillips v. State, 541 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. 1989)). Consequently, the court vacated the
previous conviction and habitual offender classification because of trial error and not
insufficient evidence, and allowed a new sentencing hearing determining Bell's
classification as a habitual offender. See id. at 456.
217. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 440 (holding that statutory procedural protections
triggered double jeopardy protections). The Bullington Court factored the existence of
the following procedural protections into its decision: (1) a second fact-finder's reviewing
of the first court's finding; (2) narrow sentencing choices; and (3) a reasonable doubt
standard of proof. See id. at 440-41. The Bullington Court distinguished these procedural
protections as greater than those in DiFrancesco. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 448
U.S. 117, 140-42 (1980); see also supra notes 154-83 and accompanying text (discussing
Bullington's holding and reasoning).
218. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2252; see also Petitioner's Brief at 37-38, Monge (No. 97-
6146) (claiming that the procedures attending a sentence enhancement under the
California statute are identical to those of a trial on guilt or innocence because the formal
rules of evidence apply, defendants are entitled to a special verdict on each prior
conviction or prison term alleged, and the jury has only two choices-to acquit the
defendant or to find that the defendant has a prior conviction); Respondent's Brief at 14,
Monge (No. 97-6146) (claiming that the procedures for California's sentence enhancement
differ from those of a trial on guilt or innocence because "[t]he lack of sentencing
discretion, a rationale for the Court's application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to capital
sentencing proceedings, is not present in this non-capital case"). The Court concluded
that, structurally, the statute's procedure is more like that in Bullington. See Monge, 118 S.
Ct. at 2252.
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proceeding.219 In so holding, the Monge majority stressed the portion
of Bullington that addressed the underlying rationale of double
jeopardy application and discarded the portion of the opinion that
highlighted procedural protections, thereby emphasizing factors not
stressed in Bullington or pre-Bullington precedent.Y0 Thus, the
Monge decision highlighted the capital nature of the sentencing as
crucial to its holding."' In Bullington, however, the Court had cited
both the capital nature of the sentencing and its procedural structure
as rationales for application of the Double Jeopardy Clause without
explicitly granting one factor more weight than the other.22 In fact,
the majority's reasoning in Bullington concentrated on structural
procedures, examining capital sentencing only at the very end of the
opinion when comparing the finality of a death sentence to the
finality of guilt or innocence in a trial.' Before even noting that the
finality of a capital sentence influenced its decision, the Court in
Bullington stated its agreement with the lower court decision that the
Missouri sentencing standards triggered the use of double jeopardy
protections0 4
In its discussion of capital sentencing, the majority in Monge
discounted the Stroud Court's holding that capital sentencing
proceedings alone do not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5 The
majority reasoned that the decision in Stroud occurred prior to the
Court's recognition that capital sentencing triggered more extensive
constitutional requirements than other sentences.226 The majority
also reasoned that the anxiety and finality in a capital sentencing
procedure are analogous to that of a trial as to guilt or innocence and
that anxiety and finality are the thrust behind the constitutional
protections.27 California Supreme Court Justice Werdegar's dissent
in Monge, however, noted that "[w]hat is missing from this discussion
is a persuasive rationale supporting the bald assertion that a criminal
defendant's 'anxiety and insecurity' when facing a possible life
219. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2252.
220. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 430-37 (failing to acknowledge that the rationale
behind the Double Jeopardy Clause factored into the majority opinion to a greater extent
than the structure of procedural protections).
221. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2252.
222 See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445-46.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 444 ("Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the
prosecution has 'proved its case.' ").





sentence as a result of past crimes is [sic] not equivalent to that
experienced by a defendant being tried for a substantive criminal
offense."
After examining whether capital sentencing is a necessary trigger
for double jeopardy protections, the Court turned to the second,
broader legal issue: whether a sentencing decision in favor of the
defendant could be analogous to an acquittal and, therefore, trigger
the rule that insufficiency of evidence precludes a retrial?39 The
majority, in holding that a sentencing proceeding does not trigger
double jeopardy protections, relied on cases distinguishing sentencing
proceedings from trial proceedings.3" The majority opinion is
consistent with precedent that declined to apply constitutional
protections to non-capital statutory sentencing proceedings 31  In
Pearce and Stroud, for example, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
bar the prosecution from asking for sentence review or bar the court
from applying a longer sentence after a defendant appealed an initial
conviction232 In DiFrancesco, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
give the defendant a right to know the final limits to his punishment
at any point in time3 3
In his dissent in Monge, Justice Stevens argued that the Double
Jeopardy Clause should prohibit any second trial in which the
prosecution presents evidence that it did not introduce in the first
trial, regardless of whether the trial is of guilt or innocence or is a
228. People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1145 (Cal. 1997) (Werdegar, J., dissenting), affd
sub. nor. Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998). Judge Werdegar also provided
illustrations of the extent to which a defendant's sentence may balloon under Three
Strikes law: "Such prior convictions, if two or more are sustained, can lead to a minimum
term of twenty-five years to life, with a maximum term consisting of the balance of the
defendant's natural life." Id. (Werdegar, J., dissenting). Statistics on how few death row
inmates are executed bolster Judge Werdegar's argument that the difference is negligible
between a criminal's anxiety when facing a life sentence and when facing the death
penalty. See Michael Vigh, U.S. Soon Will Execute 500th Convict Since '76; 500th Convict
Will Be Executed Soon, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 9, 1998, at Al (noting that the number of
prisoners executed "represents a drop in the bucket" when compared with the number of
prisoners sentenced to death).
229. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); see also supra note 125 and
accompanying text (discussing this rule and Burks).
230. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154
(1997); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,438 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. 117, 134 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969), overruled by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919)).
231. See supra notes 128-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's failure to
apply double jeopardy protections to statutory sentence enhancements).
232. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723; Stroud, 251 U.S. at 18.
233. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251; see also supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text
(discussing DiFrancesco).
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separate sentencing proceeding.214  In arguing that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant after the first trial is dismissed
for insufficient evidence but not after the trial is dismissed for trial
error, Justice Stevens cited the Court's holding in Burks v. United
States that double jeopardy precludes a second trial when the
prosecution offered insufficient evidence in the first trial.? 5  His
dissent, however, failed to explain why the holdings of Pearce or
DiFrancesco did not apply to Monge. 6  Although Justice Stevens
accurately cited Burks's holding,237 he failed to account for later Court
decisions holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause's application is
greatly influenced by whether the evidence is introduced into a trial
or a sentencing proceeding. 8  As Justice Scalia reasoned in dissent,
the effects of the evolving rule that sentencing enhancements do not
deserve double jeopardy protections require re-examination in light
of sentencing enhancements' growing presence and similarity to
criminal convictions? 9
The final, and perhaps most important, issue in Monge concerns
the validity of the blanket categorization of sentence enhancements
as different from offense elements; a related issue is whether a re-
categorization of a sentencing enhancement as an offense element is
necessary.240 The majority held that facts used in Monge's sentencing
234. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2253-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. See id. at 2253-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (failing to note that Pearce and
DiFrancesco both separated resentencing from convictions on trial).
237. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2254; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
238. See DiFrancesco v. United States, 449 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1980); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 717,719 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
239. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Susan N.
Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 293 (1992)
(noting the issue of "what constitutional limitations should be imposed on the ability of
any legislature, including Congress, to decide whether an offense-related fact is to be
treated as a sentencing factor or as an element of the offense with which the defendant is
charged"); Elizabeth J. Wiet, Witte v. United States: Double Jeopardy and the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1539, 1565 (1996) (noting
the constitutional guarantee limiting the Court from exceeding legislative authorization by
punishing a defendant multiple times for the same offense); Stephanie C. Slatkin, Note,
The Standard of Proof at Sentencing Hearings Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Why the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Is Constitutionally Inadequate, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 583, 583 (arguing that the sentencing guidelines impermissibly evade due
process requirements by reclassifying elements of charged offenses as sentencing factors).
240. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255; see also Joel W.L. Miller, Comment, Nichols v.
United States, The Right to Counsel, and Collateral Sentence Enhancement: In Search of a
Rationale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1996) (examining whether uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions can be used to enhance a defendant's sentence or whether
recidivist statutes are unconstitutional).
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were not elements of the offense. 4' The Court based this holding on
its decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,.4 which rejected
the notion that a sentence enhancement is an element of the offense
whenever the resulting punishment is greater than the maximum
sentence.24 In Almendarez-Torres, the Court determined that a
sentence increase of eighteen years was constitutionally
permissible 2 4 Consequently, the Monge Court concluded that the
increase of Monge's sentence from five years to eleven years was
within constitutional guidelines;2 45 therefore, it did not jeopardize the
defendant "for an offense."246 Despite this holding, Justice O'Connor
conceded that notions of "fundamental fairness"' 4 7 might require that
a fact be seen as an element of an offense.2'
Although Justice Scalia noted that the Almendarez-Torres Court
held an eighteen-year sentence increase to be constitutional, his
conclusion that the Court should revisit how legislatures define
offenses is justified in light of historical protections for criminal
defendants. Justice Scalia's dissent in Monge should be applied to
limit broader statutory circumvention of constitutional protections
accorded criminal defendants. In addressing the vast legislative
discretion to create resentencing procedures, Justice Scalia
highlighted an important social issue: the trend towards substituting
statutory enhancements for basic criminal convictions. 249 His dissent
alerted the Court to the slippery slope of legislative denial of
241. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
242. 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998).
243. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250-51; supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text
(discussing the Almendarez-Torres Court's holding).
244. See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1222.
245. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251.
246. Id
247. Id at 2250; see also Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REv. 1342, 1342 (1997)
(examining critics' "substantive and procedural 'fairness' objections" to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
248. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250. The majority alternatively held that "there are also
cases in which fairness calls for defining a fact as a sentencing factor." Id. The Court gave
the example of a defendant wanting to make alternative pleadings of professing innocence
to drug charges while disputing the amount he was charged with possessing. See id. The
majority reasoned that bifurcated proceedings allowed such alternative pleadings because
a defendant could profess innocence in the trial but dispute the amount for leniency in
sentencing. See id. Thus, the Court concluded that fundamental fairness did not require
"an absolute rule that an enhancement constitutes an element of the offense any time that
it increases the maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed." Id.
249. See id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 190 and accompanying
text (highlighting the trend towards statutory sentencing procedures on the state and
federal level).
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defendants' constitutional protections through the creation of
Constitution-eluding sentence enhancements2 0
Although a Court majority has not struck down a statute for
treating an offense as a sentence, Justice Scalia has called attention to
a statutory tendency to circumvent the Constitution.211 An
examination of cases involving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
provides a useful analogy for the double jeopardy question by
illustrating courts' struggles with whether constitutional protections
apply to non-capital sentence enhancements. 2 In referring to
Almendarez-Torres in his Monge dissent, Justice Scalia drew a proper
analogy between Three Strikes legislation and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: both are sentencing statutes that weigh a defendant's
likeliness to commit a further crime in meting out punishment2 3
Both the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and California's Three
Strikes law reject charge offense sentencing-or the meting out of
punishment "on the basis of the offense of conviction"-in favor of
real offense sentencing, a system that "metes out punishment on the
basis of a defendant's actual conduct in a particular case.'', 54
Additionally, a court's decision that both federal and Three Strikes
sentencing statutes trigger due process protections under the
Constitution would support the decision that a statute requires
double jeopardy protections; both protections are constitutional
rights accorded criminal defendants at trial are ordinarily not
implicated by sentencing statutes2 5 Therefore, a court's holding that
particular situations might trigger the application of greater
250. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 2255-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 1219, 1244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1222; United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084,1093 (3d Cir. 1990).
253. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (noting that criminal history is a
reasonable factor to consider in sentencing a defendant); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (noting that, through the Three Strikes law, the legislature
intended to provide greater punishment for those defendants who had previously been
convicted of crimes in order to deter crime).
254. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098-99. For explanations of the differences between real
offense sentencing and charge offense sentencing, see Herman, supra note 239, at 311;
O'Sullivan, supra note 247, at 1352.
255. Although at trial an element of an offense must be proved against a criminal
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution, see In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), under sentencing statutes, the Court has ruled that a
preponderance standard is constitutional, see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91
(1986). Similarly, the Court has held that double jeopardy and other constitutional
protections are not automatically triggered by sentencing statutes. See United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134-38 (1980).
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protections than those explicitly granted by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines should raise similar questions of whether greater
protections need be accorded to defendants sentenced under Three
Strikes laws2
6
The holdings in McMillan and Kikumura bolster Justice Scalia's
argument . 7  Although the McMillan Court determined that a
Pennsylvania statute imposing a mandatory minimum five-year
sentence258 was constitutional,1 9 then-Justice Rehnquist noted that
due process protections should be triggered by a statute that
authorizes a grave sentence increase.2 6  In holding that the
Constitution precludes a sentence "tail" from wagging the substantive
offense "dog," the Court acknowledged that criminal defendants
deserve constitutional protection because of the immense interests at
stake.261 Although, as the Kikumura Court noted, courts have
256. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250. In fact, scholars have examined the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for circumvention of both the Due Process Clause and double
jeopardy protections. See Herman, supra note 239, at 314-54 (examining the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for violations of constitutional protections, including both due
process and double jeopardy); Wiet, supra note 239, at 1564 (arguing that conviction for
"relevant conduct" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is not multiple punishment
for the same crime under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
257. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88 (limiting statutes "tailored to permit [the sentence]
to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense"); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102
("When the magnitude of the departure is so disproportionate, we believe that the
sentencing court must ratchet up not only the standard of proof, but also the standard of
admissibility."); see also Slatkin, supra note 239, at 604-05, 608 (describing Kikumura's
holding and noting that since Kikumura, courts generally have not applied a higher
standard).
258. Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 9712(a) (West 1982), subjects any defendant convicted of certain felonies to a minimum
mandatory five year sentence, conditional on the judge's finding that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the crime. Id. Under the statute, the judge may use a
preponderance of the evidence standard. See id.
259. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
260. See id. at 88-91. But see Herman, supra note 239, at 323-40 (arguing that the Court
in McMillan "reached a questionable conclusion by undervaluing due process
considerations").
261. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) ("The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility
that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction."); see also Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by
Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional Significance of "The Elements of a Sentence," 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 148, 159-60 (1993) (noting that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines decline to provide procedural protections attaching to the sentencing phase
and recommending that federal sentencing implement the full procedural protections used
by a trial on guilt or innocence); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing
Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 459,
461 (1993) (arguing that "current due process and Sixth Amendment doctrines have
abandoned the values that those constitutional provisions were supposed to serve");
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reasoned that sentencing does not trigger constitutional protection
because-unlike conviction-it occurs after a defendant is proved
guilty,2 62  a sufficiently grave sentence enhancement should be
indistinguishable from a conviction.263
As noted by Justice Scalia in Almendarez-Torres, however,
permitting enhancements of such magnitude encourages
constitutional circumvention.264  In deferring to legislatures to
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Federal Sentencing Reporter, 4 FED. SENT. R. 247, 247 (1992)
(noting the debate over whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines lack of procedure
comports with constitutional protections and concluding that the Commission should set
standards rather than allowing a judicial constitutional interpretation); Leonard N.
Sosnov, No Mere Error of State Law: When State Appellate Courts Deny Criminal
Defendants Due Process, 63 TENN. L. REV. 281, 283 (1996) (assessing the tension between
a federal court's failure to address state law errors and a criminal defendant's due process
rights and concluding that the current standard for assessment violates due process
protections); John T. Goodgame, III, Note, Retracing Our Steps: United States v.
Dunnigan and Departures from the Constitution, 34 Hous. L. REV. 259, 271-72 (1997)
(describing constitutional protection for criminal defendants, including the right to a
legitimate defense, the right to trial by jury, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to
testify on one's own behalf); Sandra K. Wolkov, Note, Reasonable Doubt in Doubt:
Sentencing and the Supreme Court in United States v. Watts, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 661,
677 (1998) (describing the Watts Court's "contention, that acquittal does not mean that a
defendant is innocent," as "both circular and at odds with historical notions of criminal
justice").
262 See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1100 (noting that the dichotomy between procedural
protections required by convictions but not by sentencing statutes "reflects the judgment
that a convicted criminal is entitled to less process than a presumptively innocent criminal
defendant"). The Third Circuit in Kikumura held that a sentence increase from 33 months
to 30 years was an example of the sentencing statute overwhelming a defendant's
convicted offense. See id. at 1101. The court was inconsistent with precedent in that it
stopped short of allotting the defendant complete constitutional protections: Although it
acknowledged that the statute offered insufficient procedural protections to the
defendant, the court only elevated the burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard,
see id, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard constitutionally mandated by
criminal convictions. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (holding that the notion that the
Government must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is "basic in our
law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society" and "a safeguard of due process of
law"). While the Kikumura court struck down the Federal Sentencing Guideline's
procedure as inadequate, it was reluctant to acknowledge the Constitution as the source of
the protections. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102 (holding that the clear and convincing
standard was "implicit" in the statute, but reserving judgment on whether a heightened
standard of proof was "implicit in the due process clause itself"). The court's claim that it
was not acting in accordance with the Constitution, but rather within implicit statutory
guidelines does not completely diminish Kikumura's importance in providing an example
of a court recognizing a statutory sentencing procedure as unfairly obscuring a defendant's
rights. See idt
263. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1244 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
264. See id at 1237-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 204-06 and
accompanying text (noting that an enhancement from 2 to 20 years does not constitute a
conviction for a separate offense and trigger constitutional protections, arguably setting
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determine what comprises an element, an offense, and a sentence, the
Court allows the conviction of criminal defendants to be disguised as
sentencing, thereby allowing legislatures to dispose of constitutional
protections.265 Justice Scalia offered the strongest argument for why
double jeopardy protections should be applied to defendants
subjected to sentence enhancements under Three Strikes law.266 In
allowing California to increase drastically an individual's sentence
while offering only statutory procedural protections, the Supreme
Court accepts the reorganization of the criminal justice system.267
"Offense" and "sentencing" become mere labels and constitutional
protections for defendants become empty rhetoric.26
In Monge, Justice Scalia noted the ability of a sentencing statute
to infringe on constitutional protections accorded criminal
defendants 69 Based on the original rationale behind constitutional
protections, a criminal defendant should not be convicted with less
than basic procedural protections, including holding the government
to a high standard of proof or safeguarding the defendant from
multiple prosecutions. Justice Scalia's reasoning is consistent with
historical principles underlying a criminal defendant's rights:
previous Court decisions holding that resentencing differs from
conviction should not apply to resentencing procedures-like
California's Three Strikes law-that so closely resemble trials of guilt
or innocence. 271
In addition to endangering constitutional protections, the Three
Strikes law has been labeled ineffective and inhumane.2 72 Although
the Three Strikes law successfully keeps convicted criminals off the
streets,2 73 many critics have expressed dissatisfaction with the law's
effects. 74 Generally, the opposition to Three Strikes legislation
the stage for acceptance of any enhancement).
265. See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1237-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 2257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (concluding that "a society that values
the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt").
271. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272 See infra notes 273-83 and accompanying text (discussing inefficiency and unfair
results of Three Strikes laws).
273. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 616-17.
274. See Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and
You're Out of Court-It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 471,
473 (1997) (discussing the effect of frivolous prisoner litigation on the court system);
Vitiello, supra note 106, at 1646-47 (discussing technical drafting problems in California's
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argues three points: (1) Three Strikes laws result in disproportionate
sentences; (2) they undermine judicial discretion; and (3) they are
unconstitutional because they violate the separation of powers
doctrine. 75
Another more concrete criticism is that the Three Strikes law is
applied to nonviolent criminals in such a way that punishments are
completely out of proportion with the crimes committed. 6  As the
Kikumura Court held, a grave sentence enhancement may be
unconstitutional and significantly unfair.2r7 In addition, critics have
pointed to both the discriminatory results of the Three Strikes law278
Three Strikes statute); Cowart, supra note 106, at 617 n.6 (noting that Three Strikes
provisions are contributing to a "skyrocketing prison population"); Robert Helgin, Note,
A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: "Three Strikes and You're Out," 20 J. LEGIS.
213, 214 (1994) (offering a critical survey of "three strikes" laws, discussing the arguments
for and against such laws and positing a new version of such laws); Mark W. Owens,
Legislative Note, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require Desperate
Measures-but Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881, 883 (1995) (questioning the efficacy of
"three strikes" policies).
275. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 649 (Cal. 1996)
(holding that if judges were denied the authority to strike prior felonies, it would violate
the state constitution). For an illustration of how Three Strikes laws undermine
constitutional balances, see Vitiello, supra note 106, at 1646-47 ("[C]ritics questioned the
balance of power between the judge and prosecutor under three strikes."). Also note the
three ancillary arguments against Three Strikes law: excessive costs of the three strikes
system, the prosecutorial backlog created, and the potential for increased levels of
violence. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 631-33.
276. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 658-59. An infamous example occurred when a
criminal was sentenced to life in prison for stealing a pizza. See id. (citing Nick DiSpoldo,
Three-Strikes Laws: Cruel and Unusual?, COMMONWEALTH, June 14, 1996, at 10-11).
Also, drug users and other non-violent criminals have been viewed as victims of the Three
Strikes law. See id.
277. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing Kikumura).
278. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 659. Forty-three percent of criminals convicted
under the Three Strikes law are African-Americans. See id. at 659 n.33. African-
Americans are 13 times more likely than Caucasians to be sentenced under the Three
Strikes law. See id. at 659. Also, there are fewer African-American district attorneys than
white district attorneys. See id. Critics claim that racism by district attorneys at the
charging phase results in use of the Three Strikes law to incarcerate African-Americans.
See id. Other sentencing statutes have been criticized for perpetuating racial bias. See
Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American
Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9 (1995) (arguing that "the
progression toward mandatory sentencing ... metes out disparate and unconstitutionally
disproportionate sentences" and criticizing sentencing trends); David Angeli, Note, A
"Second Look" at Crack Cocaine Sentencing Policies: One More Try for Federal Equal
Protection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1211, 1212 (1997) (noting that the 1984 Sentencing
Reform Act distributed much harsher punishment for crack cocaine than powder cocaine
and that this sentencing disparity is "felt almost exlcusively" by African American
defendants); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, IX. Race and
Noncapital Sentencing, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1626, 1627 (1988) (noting that the majority of
noncapital sentencing structures are "rife with racial bias" and advocating structures that
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and the fact that since the implementation of Three Strikes, prison
populations have increased to over capacity.2 79 Other concerns
include the financial burden of the Three Strikes law"0 and
theoretical problems with the legislation, including constitutional
inconsistencies inherent in its increased sentencesn81 as well as the
building of prisons for profit m Finally, Three Strikes has not
deterred crime successfully.8 Despite these problems, the Court has
not focused on curbing Three Strikes laws or other sentencing
statutes.
Previous Supreme Court decisions held that double jeopardy
protections do not apply to resentencing provisions in a non-capital
case.m4 Constitutional protections for criminal defendants and public
policy, however, urge an extension of double jeopardy protections to
include non-capital sentencing statutes such as California's Three
Strikes law.85 In reaching its decision in Monge, perhaps the Court
should have considered the issues raised by Justice Scalia's dissent.
As he pointed out, the onslaught of such statutes introduces a
complex state-run statutory system that disguises criminal convictions
as sentence enhancements and denies criminal defendants sufficient
constitutional protection8 6 Monge provided the Court with the
chance to shift double jeopardy analysis in response to a society that
threatens complete statutory overhaul of the criminal justice system.
Although the Supreme Court was accurate to interpret the Bullington
exception as applying to capital sentencing proceedings, 7 the threat
of eluding constitutional protections calls for reevaluating the factors
behind double jeopardy analysis.
"curb or eliminate" the discretionary procedures allowing such bias). But see Norral
Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence is There that Race Influences Results in the
Criminal Justice System?, 72 JuDICATURE 111, 113 (1988) (arguing that the sentencing
guideline system possesses the ability to reduce "the current demonstrable adversity" felt
by black defendants and that discrimination towards blacks is not generated by the laws
but from other sources).
279. See Cowart, supra note 106, at 660 ("Current prisons are not equipped to handle
this increase. California's prison system is presently operating at 192% of its intended
capacity, and thirteen of California's penal institutions are operating at more than 200%
capacity.").
280. See id. at 661.
281. See id. at 662-63 (examining whether cruel and unusual punishment is a valid
claim after life imprisonment for stealing a pizza).
282 See id. at 662.
283. See id. at 666.
284. See supra notes 118-89 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 190-263 and accompanying text.
286. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 2251.
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The Three Strikes law was passed amid a storm of passion and
public initiative. In so hurriedly passing a bill, the California
legislature ignored future ill effects.m Constitutional protections
exist to shield defendants from such changes in social climate and to
ensure defendants a fair trial regardless of changing political
atmosphere and legislative whim.89 In failing to ensure constitutional
safeguards to defendants facing the Three Strikes law, the Court
missed an opportunity to reaffirm a criminal defendant's right to
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause and shield against
legislative degradation of that right.
L. ALIsON HELLER
28& See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
289. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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